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MAINE TAX REFORM
Issues in Tax Reform in Maine
by Richard Woodbury
Tax reform has been prominent in public policy discussions in Maine for many years. However, there has yet to be 
comprehensive reform. Richard Woodbury notes that critics have described Maine’s tax system “as some combina-
tion of imbalanced, burdensome, unfair, uncompetitive, complex, archaic, and volatile.” He presents some of the 
features of the state’s current tax system and the approaches to reform that have been considered in recent years. 
He discusses how alternative approaches to reform might be evaluated and structured to achieve different goals, and 
highlights different ways to distribute taxes between residents and nonresidents.   
In a 2009 study for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,  “The Struggle for Tax Reform in Maine, 2003–2009,” 
I described the motivations for tax reform in Maine and 
reviewed the tax reform initiatives that were considered 
over this seven-year period (Woodbury 2009). My aim 
in this follow-up paper is to update the tax-related data 
from the earlier study, accounting for the tax policy 
changes that have been enacted since 2009, and to elab-
orate on the differential impact of alternative approaches 
to reform. 
The last major statewide commission on tax reform 
completed its work in 2003. Made up of a former 
governor, former chief justice, former speaker of the 
House, business leaders, tax accountants and economists, 
the commission recommended substantial changes to a 
system they characterized as outdated.
 For the past 20 years, the general public and the private 
sector have voiced concerns about the impact of state 
and local tax structures on Maine citizens and busi-
nesses. While the Maine economy has been undergoing 
substantial change from a natural resource based and 
manufacturing economy to a service based economy 
over the last 25 years, Maine’s tax structure has not 
changed significantly since Governor Curtis reformed 
it 33 years ago (Speaker’s Advisory Committee on Tax 
Reform 2003).
In the decade since their report, tax reform has 
remained a prominent topic of policy discussion 
and advocacy. Though changes have been made to 
aspects of Maine’s tax structure, reforms have been 
piecemeal rather than comprehensive. Maine’s tax 
system continues to be described by critics as some 
combination of imbalanced, burdensome, unfair, 
uncompetitive, complex, archaic, and volatile. 
Although support for some type of tax reform is 
nearly universal in Maine, there is no clear agreement 
on what it should entail, or even on the problems tax 
reform is designed to fix. To some, the key problem is 
the burden of property taxes. To some, it is the total of 
all Maine’s taxes that is the problem and its relation-
ship to the size of government. To some, the key issue 
is how the system treats lower-income versus higher-
income taxpayers—the progressivity (or regressivity) of 
taxes (see Johnson, this issue). To some, the key 
problem is economic incentives that drive people or 
businesses to locate elsewhere. To some, the problem is 
too many complicating exemptions, deductions, exclu-
sions, credits, and reimbursements. And to still others, 
the problem is revenue volatility and its disruptive 
impact on state spending. 
In discussing the differential impact of alternative 
approaches to tax reform, the distribution of taxes 
between residents and nonresidents is among the issues 
highlighted in the study presented here. This has 
particular relevance for Maine because of the many 
nonresidents who spend time in the state. Since some 
taxes are imposed on residents only, while others are 
collected from both nonresidents and residents, there 
are opportunities through tax reform to change that 
distribution. Tax relief measures can also be adminis-
tered in ways that disproportionately benefit residents 
over nonresidents.
In the remainder of this paper, I consider issues in 
property tax reform, income tax reform, and sales tax 
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reform, respectively. Specifically, I examine how alterna-
tive approaches to reform might be evaluated and struc-
tured to achieve different goals, such as progressivity, 
growth, revenue stability, and exportability.
PROPERTY TAX REFORM
Property taxes differ from most other forms of taxation because they are imposed on an 
asset value rather than on a payment stream, 
such as income or spending. As a result, property 
taxes may represent a small, moderate, large, or 
very large fraction of income, depending on the 
circumstances of the individual homeowner. The 
wide variability in tax burdens across house-
holds, the very high burden imposed on some 
households, and the payment of the tax in large 
annual or semiannual billings make property 
tax burdens particularly visible. Figures 1 and 
2 illustrate the degree to which property tax 
burdens vary across the population, as estimated 
by Maine Revenue Services for 2013. 
An estimated 38 percent 
of resident homeowners pay 
less than 3 percent of their 
income in property taxes, and 
35 percent pay between 3 
percent and 6 percent of their 
income. Some 28 percent of 
households pay more than 6 
percent of their income; 11 
percent of households pay 
more than 10 percent of their 
income; and 3 percent of 
households pay more than 20 
percent of their income. The 
proportion of households with 
high property tax burdens is 
particularly high at lower 
income levels, as illustrated by 
Figure 2.
Though property taxes are 
collected and spent locally, 
rather than by the state, there 
are several things that the state 
can do to relieve property 
taxes. One is to provide 
targeted property tax refunds 
to taxpayers who face a partic-
ularly high property tax 
burden. These are often referred to as property tax 
circuit breaker programs. A second is to create a prop-
erty tax exemption, such as the current $10,000 
exemption on primary residences in Maine. In Maine, 
Figure 1: Gross Property Tax Burden as Percentage of Income 
 across Maine Households, 2013
Source: Maine Revenue Services estimates, October 2013
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Figure 2: Percentage of Households with High Property  
 Tax Burden, by Income, 2013
Source: Maine Revenue Services estimates, October 2013
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such exemptions generally require the state to reim-
burse municipalities for at least half of their lost reve-
nues from the exemption. A third approach is to 
transfer more of the revenues from statewide sources 
(primarily income and sales taxes) to local governments 
and local school districts, lessening the amount that 
needs to be made up through local property taxes. 
Each of these approaches has costs to the state. Their 
distributional effects differ.
Property Tax Circuit Breakers
Property tax refund programs, or circuit breakers, 
are the most narrowly targeted approach to property 
tax relief, because the funds allocated to them are 
concentrated entirely on resident taxpayers with the 
highest individual burden of property taxes. This 
includes renters, who qualify by apportioning a certain 
percentage of their rent as the “property tax equivalent” 
cost of their housing. Some form of circuit breaker 
program has been in effect in Maine for decades, 
though program modifications have been frequent. 
The most significant circuit breaker expansion was 
enacted as part of the LD 1 reforms in 2005. The 
amount of the refunds has been cut back since 2005, 
and the program was replaced by a much smaller 
program in 2013. Maximum property tax refunds 
reached a peak of $2,000 following LD 1, and are just 
$300 (or $400 for those over age 70) now.
In earlier work with Michael Allen (Allen and 
Woodbury 2006), we demonstrated the potential for 
circuit breaker programs to offset the very high property 
tax burdens imposed on some households in Maine. 
Specifically, we analyzed the impact of the LD 1 reforms 
enacted by the legislature in 2005, including an increase 
in the maximum refund to $2,000, expanded eligibility 
to middle-income households, and a phasing out of the 
benefit at higher income levels. Our study looked at the 
proportion of households with a high net burden of 
property taxes—first, without circuit breaker benefits; 
second, based on the circuit breaker program in effect 
before LD 1; and third, based on the reformed program 
after LD 1. 
The results of our study, reproduced in Figures 3 
and 4 and based on data from the early to mid-2000s, 
examined the program’s potential tax relief if all eligible 
households applied for benefits. We showed dramatic 
potential reductions in the proportion of households 
with high property tax burdens when using a generous 
circuit breaker refund program. The reductions in tax 
burden were particularly significant among lower-
income taxpayers, as shown in Figure 4. As a frame of 
reference, the cost to state government of the LD 1 
circuit breaker program was about $45 million annually 
following its enactment in 2005.
Despite a significant scaling back in the circuit 
breaker formula for 2014, including much smaller 
maximum refunds, the estimated annual cost of the 
program is still projected by Maine Revenue Services at 
about $35 million annually. There are at least two 
reasons for this. One is that the application process for 
property tax refunds will be integrated with the filing of 
state income tax returns. Formerly, only about half of 
households eligible for circuit breaker refunds applied to 
receive them. With an integrated and simplified applica-
tion process, higher participation is projected in the 
reformed program. Second, the income measurement 
used to determine program eligibility now conforms to 
Maine’s definition of adjusted gross income, which 
excludes Social Security and other previously counted 
income sources. Under the reformed program, more 
Social Security beneficiaries in particular are likely to 
qualify for property tax refunds.
Homestead Exemptions
Homestead exemptions, though not means tested, 
are another form of property tax relief that targets 
Maine residents only. It is available to resident home-
owners on their primary residence, but is not avail-
able to renters and does not apply to vacation 
property. As noted, the current homestead exemption 
in Maine exempts the first $10,000 in the value of 
one’s principal residence from being taxed. The level 
of Maine’s homestead exemption has also been 
MAINE TAX REFORM
… circuit breakers are the most 
narrowly targeted approach to 
property tax relief because [funds] 
are concentrated entirely on resi-
dent taxpayers with the highest … 
burden of property taxes.
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adjusted in past reforms, reaching a level of $13,000 
following the LD 1 reforms.
There are at least three distributional implica-
tions of the homestead exemption. First, it is worth 
proportionately more to owners of lower-valued 
homes than it is to higher-valued homes. For example, 
today’s $10,000 homestead exemption reduces 
by just 1 percent the taxable value of a $1 
million homestead, but it reduces by 20 
percent the taxable value of a $50,000 home-
stead. Second, the exemption is worth more in 
communities that already burden taxpayers 
with high property tax rates. In a community 
with a high property tax rate, say 25 mils for 
example, Maine’s current homestead exemp-
tion translates roughly into $250 in property 
tax relief. In a community with a low property 
tax rate, say 8 mils, the relief would be just 
$80. Third, because the homestead exemption 
is only partially reimbursed, non-homestead 
property owners may pay higher taxes to make 
up for lost revenues that are not reimbursed. 
Higher taxes will generally be paid on property 
owned by nonresidents, commercial property, 
and vacation property.
To summarize, the home-
stead exemption provides more 
concentrated property tax relief 
to resident homeowners (rela-
tive to nonresident and com-
mercial taxpayers), to lower- 
valued homes (relative to 
higher-valued homes), and to 
communities with higher tax 
rates already.
School Funding and 
Municipal Revenue Sharing
Transfers from state 
revenues to municipalities 
and school districts are a 
broader form of property tax 
relief. The way the school-
funding formula works, the 
state first determines the 
total amount that it will 
transfer to local school 
districts in general purpose 
aid to education (GPA). 
Based on that allocation, the state then calculates a 
statewide property tax “mil rate expectation” that 
will raise sufficient additional funds to fully support 
“essential programs and services” (EPS) at all of 
Maine’s public schools. When more state resources 
are allocated to school funding, the statewide mil 
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Figure 3: Effect of Circuit Breaker on Percentage of Maine  
 Households with Higher Property Tax Burden
Source: Allen and Woodbury 2006
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Figure 4: Percentage of Maine Households with Property 
 Tax Burden above 6 Percent of Income
Source: Allen and Woodbury 2006
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rate expectation is reduced, 
thereby lowering property taxes. 
A similar substitution of 
state funds for local funds occurs 
when the state allocates money 
for municipal revenue sharing. 
Given a fixed local budget, more 
municipal revenue sharing trans-
lates into less being required from 
local property taxes. Of course, 
the dollars spent by the state on 
school funding and municipal 
revenue sharing need not all 
translate into property tax relief. 
It may also allow municipalities 
and school districts to spend 
more than they otherwise would. 
There is no broad consensus 
on the extent to which incremental funding for these 
programs lowers property taxes, as compared with 
increasing local spending.
The stated aim of state government is to distribute 
5 percent of its revenues to municipalities in the form 
of municipal revenue sharing and to support 55 
percent of the EPS cost of K-12 education. In practice, 
however, budgetary pressures and other legislative 
priorities have reduced these allocations. Figure 5 
shows real spending by the state on the circuit breaker 
program, homestead exemption, revenue sharing, and 
general purpose aid to education, respectively, for fiscal 
years 1996 through the recently approved 2014 and 
2015 budgets. (The historical amounts are inflation-
adjusted to fiscal year 2013 dollars.)
Figure 5 shows an increase in inflation-adjusted 
state spending for these purposes from 1996 to 2008, 
particularly following the enactment of LD 1 in 2005, 
and then a pronounced drop in funding precipitated by 
economic conditions and other factors since 2008. (It is 
worth noting that school enrollment has also declined 
over this period, from about 214,000 public school 
students in 1996 to about 185,000 today.) The article by 
Shaw (this issue) provides further discussion about the 
changes in revenue sharing and school funding, and the 
municipal responses to these state revenue changes.
Who Benefits from Each Approach?
Throughout this discussion is an implicit trade-off 
between the depth and breadth of property tax relief 
associated with different funding measures. The circuit 
breaker program is the most narrowly targeted, bene-
fiting resident homeowners with high property tax 
burdens and resident renters with high housing cost 
burdens. The homestead exemption is the next most 
targeted, benefiting resident homeowners only, and 
with larger proportionate benefits to those with less 
valuable homes and to those with higher property tax 
rates already.
Incrementally increasing municipal revenue sharing 
or school funding are broader forms of property tax 
relief, but their impact across communities is uneven. 
Within any community, their effect is to reduce the 
property tax mil rate across the board for all property tax 
payers, whether resident or nonresident, primary home 
or vacation home, residential or commercial. The relief 
is proportional to what taxpayers pay already. Comparing 
across communities, however, there are distinct differ-
ences between the effects on property taxes of revenue 
sharing and school-funding support.
For most communities throughout Maine, an 
increase in general purpose aid to education lowers the 
EPS mil rate expectation by the same amount—about 
0.1 mil per $10 million in incremental state funding—
regardless of the existing property tax rate in each 
community. The exceptions are those communities in 
Maine, referred to as “minimum receivers,” that have 
enough property value to raise the full cost of EPS with 
a tax rate lower than the mil rate expectation. These 
communities benefit little or not at all from an increase 
in state funding for education. Though they are a 
minority of communities in the state, a disproportionate 
Figure 5: State Expenditures Related to Property Taxes  
 ($ millions, inflation-adjusted)
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number of Maine’s vacation properties are located in 
minimum receiver communities.
Municipal revenue sharing is allocated across 
communities using a different formula, where communi-
ties with higher property tax mill rates receive larger 
allocations. Thus, higher-mil-rate communities, including 
so-called service center communities, are more explicitly 
targeted. The municipal revenue sharing formula works 
in a continuous way—the higher the mil rate, the greater 
the relief provided. The school-funding formula has more 
of a kink in the formula, where communities on one side 
of the kink (the minimum receivers) get virtually nothing, 
whereas communities above the kink (those paying the 
EPS mil rate expectation) get essentially the same mil rate 
relief, regardless of overall tax rate.
Illustrative Effects of State-Funded  
Property Tax Relief
To further illustrate these implications, I estimate 
the impact on property taxes of allocating an additional 
$50 million in state resources to four alternative prop-
erty tax relief measures. The first approach would add 
$50 million to general purpose aid to education, raising 
the allocation from $947 million to $997 million, and 
bringing Maine closer to its stated goal of 55 percent. 
The effect of this reform is to lower the statewide mil rate 
expectation for K-12 education from 7.86 mils to about 
7.34 mils, or by about 0.52 mils in most Maine commu-
nities. The property tax savings would be about $50 on 
a $100,000 home, $100 on a $200,000 home, and $500 
on a $1 million home. There would be no property tax 
savings in minimum receiver communities.
The second approach would add $50 million to 
municipal revenue sharing, raising the allocation from 
$65 million to $115 million, and approaching the stated 
public policy goal of 5 percent. The effect of this policy 
is to lower the mil rate for all taxpayers throughout the 
state, but more significantly in communities with higher 
property tax mil rates already. For example, the 50,000 
resident homeowners paying the highest property tax 
rates would see an average reduction of about 0.96 mils, 
from 20.61 to 19.65, translating to about $100 in prop-
erty tax savings on a $100,000 home, $200 on a 
$200,000 home, and $1,000 on a $1 million home. The 
50,000 resident homeowners paying the lowest property 
tax rates in the state would see an average mil rate reduc-
tion of 0.14 mills, from 9.16 to 9.02, or about $15 in 
property tax savings on a $100,000 home, $30 on a 
$200,000 home, and $150 on a $1 million home.
The third approach uses the $50 million to increase 
the homestead exemption from the current level of 
$10,000 to $30,000. Because municipalities are reim-
bursed for only half of the lost tax base, this results in an 
average increase in mil rate of 0.31, from 13.32 to 13.63. 
This draws a modestly increased property tax share 
from nonresident and commercial taxpayers.  For 
all but the most valuable homestead properties, 
the increase in the exempt amount far outweighs 
the increase in rate. The property tax savings in an 
“average” community, therefore, would be about 
$250 on a $100,000 home, $210 on a $200,000 
home, and no savings on a $1 million home.
The fourth approach uses the $50 million to 
restore the circuit breaker benefit formula enacted 
in LD 1 in 2005. The effect of this policy varies 
with the individual circumstances of the property 
owner or renter. For those without a high burden 
of property taxes (or rent), there would be no prop-
erty tax savings from the increased funding. For 
those with the greatest burden of property taxes (or 
rent), savings are as much as $2,000 per household. 
To further analyze these impacts, I consider 
three illustrative homesteads and three illustrative 
nonresident properties, shown in Figures 6 and 7, 
respectively. (The circuit breaker is not included in 
these illustrations because its effect—though the 
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Figure 6: Impact of $50 Million in Property Tax Relief 
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largest of all for residents with high property tax 
burden—cannot be generalized across properties 
in the same way.)
In Figure 6, the Waterville residence is 
illustrative of a modest home in a high-tax-rate 
community. The Portland residence is illustrative 
of a typical home in Maine’s largest city. The 
Scarborough residence is a higher-valued home in 
a coastal community. Because the homestead 
exemption benefits high-mil-rate communities 
and lower-valued properties more, its biggest 
impact is in the Waterville and Portland illustra-
tion. The more valuable Scarborough home bene-
fits most from the lower-mil-rate expectation 
created by increased school funding.
The nonresident and commercial illustra-
tions in Figure 7 are also instructive. For example, 
the first illustration is for the same $600,000 
Scarborough home included in Figure 6, but 
owned by a nonresident rather than a resident. The 
nonresident receives essentially the same property tax 
relief from additional school funding as the resident, 
and the same property tax relief from additional 
revenue sharing as the resident. The homestead exemp-
tion, however, increases taxes on the nonresident and 
commercial taxpayers, while decreasing them on the 
resident.
Figure 7 also compares two identical homes in 
Scarborough and Camden owned by nonresidents. The 
effects of an increase in revenue sharing or the home-
stead exemption are comparable across these properties. 
The effects of school funding, however, are dramatically 
different. Scarborough is subject to the statewide EPS 
mil rate expectation, which declines with additional 
school funding, thereby lowering property taxes. 
Camden, on the other hand, is a minimum receiver, able 
to support EPS costs at a mil rate that is already lower 
than the statewide rate. Therefore, additional school 
funding has no impact in Camden. Camden is illustra-
tive of the most highly valued recreational areas of 
Maine’s coast, lakefront, and mountains where a lot of 
Maine’s vacation properties are concentrated.
INCOME TAX REFORM
Three issues have dominated discussions of Maine’s income taxes. The first is the top tax rate. Because it 
is higher than most states, it may discourage some indi-
viduals and businesses from locating in Maine, thereby 
dampening Maine’s economic performance. The magni-
tude of this effect, however, is a subject of considerable 
controversy. The second issue is the progressivity of 
the income tax, particularly in conjunction with other 
taxes that burden lower-income households dispropor-
tionately. The income tax formula can be calibrated to 
achieve nearly any progressivity objective. The third 
issue is the cost of Maine’s many tax exemptions, deduc-
tions, credits, and reimbursements that have been incor-
porated in the system over time. Although each advances 
some public purpose, they also reduce revenues or 
require higher tax rates to maintain the same revenues.
Maine’s new income tax formula has tax rates of 6.5 
percent and 7.95 percent. Table 1 shows the total income 
ranges in which a “typical” taxpayer is subject to these 
marginal tax rates in 2013, assuming they use the standard 
deduction and earn all income from nonexempt sources.
Those concerned with the competitiveness of 
Maine’s income tax structure focus on both the 7.95 
percent rate and the moderate income level at which 
that rate is imposed. Figure 8 compares Maine’s 7.95 
percent tax rate with the highest rates used in other 
states, using tax information compiled by the Federation 
of Tax Administrators for 2013. The figure shows that 
the 7.95 percent top marginal tax rate in Maine is the 
ninth highest among the 50 states. The median state has 
a top marginal income tax rate of 6 percent. Among the 
states with the highest marginal income tax rates (above 
8 percent), New York imposes its highest rate only on 
individual taxable income above $1 million; California 
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Figure 7: Impact of $50 Million in Property Tax Relief 
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and New Jersey, above $500,000; Vermont, above 
$388,350; Washington, DC, above $350,000; Hawaii, 
above $200,000; Oregon, above $125,000; and Iowa, 
above $67,230. By contrast, Maine imposes its highest 
rate on more modest incomes.
Approaches to Reform
Proposals for income tax reform in Maine have 
encompassed two distinct approaches and multiple 
specifics. The first would retain the basic structure of the 
state’s current income tax, which parallels the federal tax 
system to a significant extent. That is, the state income 
tax features a progressive rate structure, personal exemp-
tions for filers and dependents, and a choice of standard 
or itemized deductions. This traditional approach to tax 
reform involves reducing income tax obligations within 
the existing framework, such as by adjusting tax rates or 
tax brackets. This was the approach used in 2011, when 
the legislature enacted an income tax reduction that 
took effect in 2013. The reform increased the level of 
income one needs to earn before being subject to any tax 
and replaced the four marginal tax rates that existed 
previously (2.0 percent, 4.5 percent, 7.0 percent, and 
8.5 percent) with the current two-rate system of 6.5 
percent and 7.95 percent. Figure 9 shows the impact of 
the reform on taxpayers at different income levels, illus-
trated by the total tax rate paid by a four-person family 
using the standard deduction under the old and new 
systems, respectively.
Table 1: Total Income Threshold for Each Income  
 Tax Rate in Maine, 2013
Tax Rate Individual Married  Couple
Four-Person 
Family
No Tax <$15,200 <$28,400 <$36,200
6.5% Rate $15,200–$30,900 $28,400–$59,800 $36,200–$67,600
7.95% Rate >$30,900 >$59,800 >$67,600
Source: Maine Revenue Services
Figure 8: Highest Income Tax Rates by State, 2013
Source: FTA 2013a
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MAINE TAX REFORM
The second approach to reforming 
income taxes would fundamentally change 
the structural foundation of the system, 
typically by applying a lower flat-rate tax, 
eliminating personal exemptions and 
(standard or itemized) deductions, and 
replacing them with a tax credit that 
phases out at higher income levels. By 
choosing the flat-tax rate and calibrating 
the magnitude and phase-out of the 
household credit, one can accomplish 
virtually any distribution of tax burden 
across income groups. The level of the flat 
rate determines the highest average tax 
rate that any taxpayer will pay in the 
reformed system. The design and calibra-
tion of the household credit determines 
the distribution of reduced tax burden 
below the flat rate.
In the current legislative session, a 
bipartisan group in which I participated 
presented versions of a more comprehen-
sive income tax reform plan that illustrates 
this second approach. The so-called gang-
of-eleven plan dropped the top income tax 
rate by as much as half, eliminated many 
tax expenditures, and made up for lost 
revenues from increased sales and excises 
taxes. Three versions of the gang-of-eleven 
plan are presented in Figure 10, one with 
a top income tax rate of 4.95 percent, one 
with a top rate of 4.5 percent, and one 
with a top rate of 4 percent. 
An innovative feature of the plan was 
a new “sales tax fairness credit,” integrated 
into the income tax formula, that was 
designed to offset the disproportionate 
burden of sales taxes on lower-income 
resident households. The negative tax 
rates at the left of Figure 10 correspond to 
these refundable tax credits. Depending 
on the calibration of the plan formulas, the integrated 
system could moderate, or even eliminate, the overall 
regressivity of sales taxes and reestablish progressivity 
within a flat-rate income tax structure. 
What are the relative merits of the traditional pro-
gressive rate structure versus the more innovative flat tax 
with a progressive credit? One clear difference is the 
visibility of the top “published” tax rate. In the current 
system, for example, the top tax rate of 7.95 percent is a 
highly visible component feature of Maine’s system and 
likely deters some individuals and businesses from 
locating in Maine. An important insight in designing 
the flat-rate alternative systems is that nobody actually 
pays a full 7.95 percent of their income in taxes, after 
accounting for personal exemptions, standard or item-
ized deductions, and the portions of income that are 
Figure 9: Income Tax Reform Taking Effect in 2013  
 (total tax rate for a four-person family using  
 the standard deduction)
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Figure 10: “Gang-of-Eleven” Tax Reform Plans  
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MAINE TAX REFORM
taxed at a lower rate. A four-person family with income 
of $200,000 and itemized deductions of $30,000, for 
example, now pays about $10,989, or 5.5 percent of its 
income, in Maine income taxes. The family’s average tax 
rate of 5.5 percent is much lower than its marginal tax 
rate of 7.95 percent. A flat tax with a phased-out credit 
allows the published top tax rate in Maine to reflect the 
highest average rate, rather than the highest marginal 
rate. The extent to which economic activity is driven 
primarily by the published tax rate, the average tax rate 
or the marginal tax rate, is a subject for another study. 
SALES TAX REFORM
Maine imposes a 5 percent general sales tax (tempo-rarily increased to 5.5 percent), a 7 percent tax on 
prepared meals and lodging (temporarily increased to 
8 percent), a 10 percent tax on rental cars, and a 0.44 
percent tax on real estate transfers. Maine also imposes 
an excise tax on cigarettes at $2.00 per pack, beer and 
hard cider at $0.35 per gallon, wine at $0.60 per gallon, 
and sparkling wine and low-alcohol spirits at $1.24 per 
gallon. (Those rates include both the base tax rate and a 
supplementary premium tax.) 
Two issues have motivated interest in reforming 
sales and excise taxes. First, sales and excise taxes have 
been suggested as the area where the state could increase 
revenues to offset lower income and property taxes. 
Although income and property taxes are generally 
considered high in Maine, sales taxes are considered at 
or below the average of states. Thus, sales and excise tax 
reform is usually advanced as part of an umbrella of 
reforms that aim to rebalance Maine’s tax system more 
comprehensively. Figure 11 compares the sales tax rate 
across states, based on summary data from the Federation 
of Tax Administrators. 
At the temporarily raised rate of 5.5 percent, Maine 
is near the median of states. It is worth noting that 
Figure 11: Sales Tax Rates by State
Source: FTA 2013b
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MAINE TAX REFORM
roughly half of states allow local sales taxes on top of the 
statewide rates. If we include these additional local rates 
in the comparison, Maine’s rate might be considered 
that much lower by comparison. 
The second issue motivating discussions of sales tax 
reform involves the appropriate breadth of the sales tax 
base, and particularly its exclusion of most services. As 
the composition of consumer purchases has evolved over 
time to include more services, advocates of reform 
contend that the sales tax base should also expand. 
Advocates of sales and excise tax reform also emphasize 
the volatility of revenues that results from a narrower tax 
base. For example, roughly a third of sales tax revenues 
are attributable to sales of automobiles and construction 
materials, both of which are highly cyclical industries.
Comparing the sales tax base across states is more 
complicated, as the definitions of product and service 
categories that may be subject to tax can differ consider-
ably. The Federation of Tax Administrators, however, 
conducts a periodic survey of states on 168 potentially 
taxable services (FTA 2008). The services included in 
the survey are not intended to be comprehensive or 
complete. Nevertheless, they give some sense of the 
scope of services that may be taxed and of the broad 
variation among states in the number of such services 
taxed. Based on data from the last survey in 2007, 
Figure 12 illustrates the variation across states in the 
number of service categories taxed in different states. 
Based on this measure, Maine appears to have a sales tax 
base that is narrower than that of most states, taxing 25 
of the categories in the survey, compared with 55 at the 
median (among states with a sales tax), and up to 160 at 
the extreme.
Sales tax reform proposals include both rate 
changes and changes to the sales that are subject to tax. 
The simplest reforms would raise one or more sales or 
excise tax rates. For example, increases in the cigarette 
tax and/or the lodging tax are proposed in nearly every 
legislative session. More complicated reform proposals 
would expand the base of the sales tax, most commonly 
Figure 12: Number of Services Taxed by State
Source: FTA, 2007 Survey
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1 Maine generally taxes the leasor on the original purchase, but not the consumer leasing the property.
Illustrative Services in 2007 FTA Survey: Services Taxed in at Least 10 States but Not Taxed in Maine
Leases and Rentals1  (contd.)
Aircraft rental to individual pilots,  
short term 40
Aircraft rental to individual pilots, long term 39
Limousine service (with driver) 16
Personal Services
Tuxedo rental 38
Diaper service 23
Health clubs, tanning parlors, reducing  
salons 22
Laundry and dry cleaning services,  
non-coin op 22
Gift and package wrapping service 21
Garment services (altering & repairing) 20
Shoe repair 20
Carpet and upholstery cleaning 19
Swimming pool cleaning & maintenance 17
Income from funeral services 13
Water softening & conditioning 13
Fishing & hunting guide services 11
Massage services 11
Storage
Automotive storage 19
Marina Service (docking, storage,  
cleaning, repair) 17
Fur storage 16
Mini-storage 14
Household goods storage 13
Cold storage 13
Food storage 10
Packing & crating 10
Transportation Services
Income from  intrastate transportation  
of persons 11
Utility Service
Interstate telephone & telegraph, ind. 27
Interstate telephone & telegraph, res. 27
Other fuel (including heating oil), res. 23
Natural gas, residential 22
Sewer and refuse, industrial 15
Water, residential 12
Sewer and refuse, residential 11
Admissions & Amusements
Admission to professional sports events 37
Amusement park admission & rides 36
Circuses and fairs—admission & games 34
Admission to cultural events 31
Pari-mutuel racing events. 29
Billiard parlors 27
Bowling alleys 27
Membership fees in private clubs. 23
Admission to school & 
college sports events 22
Pinball & other mechanical amusements 19
Coin operated video games 17
Agricultural Services
Landscaping services (including lawn care) 21
Pet grooming 18
Automotive Services
Auto service. except repairs, 
including painting & lube 25
Automotive rustproofing & undercoating 25
Automotive washing & waxing 21
Parking lots & garages 21
Automotive road service 
and towing services 19
Business Services
Commercial linen supply 33
Tire recapping & repairing 28
Exterminating (includes termite services) 21
Telephone answering service 20
Maintenance & janitorial services 19
Window cleaning 19
Security services 18
Armored car services 16
Private investigation (detective) services 16
Credit information, credit bureaus 13
Employment agencies 11
Packing & crating 11
Interior design & decorating 10
Temporary help agencies 10
Computer
Software—modifications 
to canned program 29
Software—custom programs—material 24
Computer (continued)
Software—custom programs—
professional serv. 14
Information services 13
Internet Service Providers-DSL 
or other broadband 12
Mainframe computer access 
& processing serv. 11
Construction
Carpentry, painting, plumbing & similar  
trades 13
Gross Income of Construction Contractors 12
Construction service (grading, 
excavating, etc.) 12
Water well drilling 10
Fabrication, Installation and Repair Services
Service contracts sold at the time of sale  
of TPP 32
Repair labor, generally 24
Labor on radio/TV repairs; other electronic  
equipment 24
Labor charges—repairs other tangible  
property 24
Installation charges by persons selling  
property 23
Labor charges on repairs to motor vehicles 21
Labor charges—repairs to intrastate  
vessels 20
Installation charges—other than seller  
of goods 18
Labor charges on repair of aircraft 16
Labor—repairs to commercial  
fishing vessels 15
Labor—repairs or remodeling  
of real property 15
Custom meat slaughtering, cutting  
& wrapping 14
Labor charges—repairs to interstate  
vessels 11
Labor charges on repairs to railroad  
rolling stock 11
Leases and Rentals1
Personal property, short term (generally) 45
Personal property, long term (generally) 45
Bulldozers, draglines & const. mach 45
Rental of hand tools to licensed  
contractors 45
MAINE TAX REFORM
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to consumer services. Examples are recreational 
services such as golf, skiing, movies, amusement parks, 
or concerts; repair services such as for cars, lawn 
mowers, or appliances; personal property services such 
as dry cleaning, rug cleaning, car washing, picture 
framing, or storage; or personal care services such as 
hair cutting, beauty salons, and massage. The sidebar 
lists some of the services that the 2007 FTA survey 
reports as taxed in at least 10 states, but that are not 
taxed in Maine.
The extent to which Maine could or should expand 
its sales tax base is a question of considerable political 
and substantive controversy. No industry now exempt 
from sales tax wants to lose that exemption. Other 
policy considerations are avoiding pyramiding (taxing 
both the inputs to production and the final product); 
the mobility of business activity across state lines by 
buyers or providers attempting to avoid the tax (such as 
those providing professional services); and the potential 
regressivity of taxing necessities (such as groceries and 
household utilities). 
TAX REFORM AND EXPORTING
As noted in the introduction, there is a large nonresi-dent presence in Maine. Maine’s nonresident popu-
lation includes at least three categories of people living 
part of the year in Maine. First, there are the nonresi-
dent owners of second homes in Maine’s ocean, lake, 
and mountain communities. U.S. Census data show 
that Maine has by far the highest percentage of second 
homes of any state in the country—more than 118,000 
vacation homes—many of which are owned and used 
for extended periods by nonresident families (see Figure 
13). Second, Maine is a highly visited vacation state, 
symbolized by its “vacationland” motto.  The Maine 
Office of Tourism estimates that there are nearly 15 
million nonresident vacation visitors to Maine annually, 
Figure 13: Share of Housing Units that Are Vacation Homes by State, 2010
Source: FTA, 2007 Survey
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averaging 3.7 nights per visit (Maine Office of Tourism 
2013). Third, at least anecdotally, there appear to be 
sizable numbers of nonresident retirees in Maine, some 
of whom spend as much as five or six months per year 
in the state.
The importance of residence to tax policy is best 
illustrated by two identical retirees, each of whom 
spends six months in Maine and six months in Florida. 
One of them remains a Maine resident, but spends an 
extended period of winter in Florida. The other carefully 
documents their presence in the two states to be classi-
fied for tax purposes as a Florida resident. When in 
Maine, both retirees look much the same, driving on 
Maine roads, using Maine’s hospitals as needed, and 
enjoying Maine’s communities, environment, and 
quality of life. One of them is subject to the full weight 
of Maine’s 7.95 percent income tax. The other is fully 
exempt from all state income taxes. While Maine cannot 
impose income taxes on these nonresident retirees, it 
could draw more revenues from the categories of taxes 
that nonresidents do pay.
Put differently, the weighting of Maine’s income, 
sales, and property taxes is important to how Maine’s 
taxes are apportioned between residents and nonresi-
dents. Nonresidents who spend time in Maine are gener-
ally exempt from state income taxes, often reside in 
high-valuation regions with low property tax mil rates, 
and devote a large portion of their spending in Maine to 
purchases that are exempt from sales taxes. By taxing 
consumption more universally and more heavily, propo-
nents argue, the state can allocate the tax burden in 
rough proportion to the amount of time people spend 
in Maine (or the dollars they spend in Maine), rather 
than whether they are defined as residents or nonresi-
dents. The revenues from consumption taxes, which are 
imposed on both residents and nonresidents, can then 
be directed to income tax and property tax relief that 
benefits Maine residents almost exclusively.
Each of the comprehensive tax reform proposals of 
the last decade—none of them successfully enacted—has 
clearly emphasized the goal of exporting more of Maine’s 
taxes to nonresidents. For example, LD 1925 in 2007 
was a revenue neutral proposal, explicitly entitled “An Act 
to Cut Taxes on Maine Residents by over $140,000,000.” 
The pared-down version of tax reform introduced as LD 
1088 in 2009, also revenue neutral, was entitled “An Act 
to Modernize the Tax Laws and Provide over $75,000,000 
to Residents of the State in Tax Relief.” Maine Revenue 
Services estimated that the further pared-down tax 
reform bill that was ultimately vetoed by citizen refer-
endum in 2010, LD 1495 would reduce the tax burden 
on Maine residents by about $50 million. 
The recent gang-of-eleven reform plan proposed an 
even larger shift away from income taxes and toward 
sales and excise taxes than any of these earlier plans. It 
also contained a proposal for a $50,000 homestead 
exemption that would have provided additional prop-
erty tax relief targeted at residents. Though the degree of 
exporting in the plan was not estimated, the intent was 
to raise about $700 million in additional annual reve-
nues from sales and excise taxes (paid by residents and 
nonresidents alike), while providing $700 million in 
resident-targeted tax relief through Maine’s income and 
property tax systems. It relied on both higher sales and 
excise tax rates, and a substantial broadening of the sales 
tax base to achieve these aims.
Although the exporting of tax burden to nonresi-
dents is viewed favorably by many, and the reduced tax 
burden on residents likely has a positive economic 
impact, there are offsetting implications that need to be 
weighed against these benefits. Specifically, to what 
extent do higher taxes on nonresidents discourage them 
from spending in Maine and how does this negative 
economic impact compare with the positive impact of 
lower taxes on residents? Many in the tourism industry, 
for example, point to the potential of tourism-related 
taxes (such as an increase in the lodging tax, or a new 
sales tax on ski-lift tickets) to discourage out-of-state 
visitors from spending time in Maine. Many in the real 
estate industry make a similar claim with respect to 
proposed increases in the real estate transfer tax. They 
suggest that increasing that tax may discourage purchases 
of second homes in Maine, or reduce the market value 
of existing real estate investments. 
MAINE TAX REFORM
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Few would argue that the failure of comprehensive tax reform over the last decade is an indication that 
Maine’s tax system is in fact perfectly structured as it is 
now. Differences in policy objectives, however, have so 
far impeded comprehensive solutions. Still, the piece-
meal changes made over the past several years are not 
insignificant.
The income tax reduction taking effect in 2013 was 
lauded by advocates as the biggest tax cut in Maine 
history. That it removed an estimated 77,000 house-
holds from owing any income tax was a significant 
change, as was the lowering of the top rate from 8.5 
percent to 7.95 percent. At the same time, the budget 
pressures that resulted in part from the tax cut were one 
reason for the temporary increases in the sales tax rate 
that also took effect in late 2013. Though these changes 
are real, there is little sense that they have “solved” 
Maine’s tax and budget problems for the long term. 
The most significant property tax reform since 
2005 was the redesign of the circuit breaker program 
for 2014. Integrated into the income tax filing, it is 
expected that many more eligible recipients will now 
file for property tax refunds under the redesigned 
program. However, the maximum refund has been 
reduced from $2,000 following LD 1 to $1,600 in 
recent years to just $300 ($400 for those over age 70) 
now. The program also uses a substantially narrowed 
income measure to determine eligibility, but a signifi-
cantly higher tax burden threshold to qualify. While 
simpler to administer, this will increase eligibility to 
some taxpayers and decrease eligibility for others in 
ways that may correspond less precisely to need.
Whatever its objectives, it is likely that tax reform 
will remain a visible and controversial subject of policy 
discussions. The aim of this paper is to update the tax-
related data that I presented in earlier work, accounting 
for the changes in tax policy of the last few years, and 
to discuss how alternative approaches to reform might 
be evaluated and structured to achieve different goals, 
such as progressivity, growth, revenue stability, and 
exportability.  -
REFERENCES
Allen, Michael, and Richard Woodbury. 2006. “Containing 
the Individual Burden of Property Taxes: A Case Study 
of Circuit Breaker Expansion in Maine.” National Tax 
Journal 59(3): 665-683.
Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) 2013a. State 
Individual Income Taxes. FTA, Washington, DC.  
www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.pdf [Accessed 
November 1, 2013]
Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA). 2013b. State 
Sales Tax Rates and Food and Drug Exemptions. FTA, 
Washington, DC. www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.pdf 
[Accessed November 1, 2013]
Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA). 2008. “FTA Survey 
of Services Taxation: Update.” By the Numbers 
Newsletter (July).
Johnson, Joel. 2013. “The Distributional Effects of Recent 
Changes to Maine’s Tax System.” Maine Policy Review 
22(2): 26-33.
Maine Office of Tourism, 2013. Visitor Tracking Research: 
2012 Calendar Year Annual Report. DPA, Kennebunk, 
ME. www.visitmaine.com/resource/visitmaine/vault/
application/2012-annual-report.pdf [Accessed  
November 1, 2013]
Shaw, Emily. 2013. “The Impact of Post-Recession State 
Revenue Reductions on Maine’s Municipalities.” Maine 
Policy Review 22(2): 34-41.
Speaker’s Advisory Committee on Tax Reform. 2003. 
Final Report of the Speaker’s Advisory Committee on 
Tax Reform to the First Regular Session of the 121st 
Legislature. Maine State Legislature, Augusta.
Woodbury, Richard, 2009. The Struggle for Tax Reform 
in Maine, 2003-2009. Discussion Paper 09-2. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston.
Richard Woodbury is an econo-
mist and Maine state senator. 
He has served five terms in the 
legislature, one of them as chair of 
the tax committee, and has been 
involved in numerous bipartisan 
groups interested in reforming 
Maine’s tax system. Outside the legislature, he works with 
a national research and education program on population 
aging.
MAINE TAX REFORM
